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NRC Summary:
Provide analysis to confirm room temperatures for normal and accident conditions. 
GEH Response
Detailed thermo-hydraulic heat up analyses were performed with the computer code CONTAIN 2.0 to calculate the room heat up in the Reactor Building and Control Building to show that the equipment qualification temperatures presented in Tables 3H-3 , 3H-4, 3H-9, and 3H-10 will not be exceeded. The Reactor Building and Control Building are integrated models so that room-to-room interactions would be considered.
All heat loads were considered in the modeling of the buildings. The electrical heat loads considered in the calculations can be found in Table 3H -12. A 10% margin was considered for all electrical heat loads except in the Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) heat loads where a 15% margin was considered. During accident conditions, Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) is considered to be unavailable and therefore will not provide a heat load. Solar loads, personnel loads and lighting have been considered in the calculations. All calculations are performed for summertime conditions with the exception of the CRHA where summertime and wintertime conditions are considered. The case for the CRHA post 72 hours presented in Table  3H -15 which accounts for heat loads from people and minimal lighting only, demonstrates that the cool down for the Reactor Building and Control Building are inconsequential because of the 200 I/s of -40*C (-40 0 F) air that is being blown into the CRHA by the Emergency Filter Units (EFUs). There will be no outside air blown mechanically into rooms containing safety related equipment in the remaining control building rooms or reactor building rooms. Cases were considered to ensure that the 0% exceedance outside air temperature was bounding, and 100% relative humidity with additional moisture created by CRHA occupants (latent load) would not lead to a Enclosure 1 72 hour CRHA air temperature higher than the 0% exceedance coincident maximum temperature, and ensure the heat absorbed by the CRHA structures would not be adversely impacted by the condensation created. The results of this analysis show that higher humidity ratios, and subsequently higher specific enthalpy, do not affect the maximum temperature reached with little condensation occurring on the walls of the control room.
An initial room temperature higher than design value maximum temperature is assumed in all rooms except the CRHA where the maximum design temperature is considered. The event considered in the analysis is the most limiting between a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) (including Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)) or High Energy Line Break (HELB) with each concurrent with Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP). Normal HVAC heating and/or cooling is lost for the first 72 hours of the event. After 72 hours the safety-related equipment heat loads are no longer accounted for because the safetyrelated equipment needed to maintain safe shutdown no longer requires power to perform their safety functions. Additional cases were considered with HVAC power restored to mitigate the safety-related equipment heat loads. During the first 2 hours of the event the nonsafety-related heat loads in the Reactor Building and in the Control Building outside of the CRHA powered by the nonsafety-related batteries are considered in the analysis. Safety-related heat loads are considered throughout the duration of the event when power is available. The CRHA calculation only considers safety-related heat loads. Nonsafety-related equipment de-energizes if active cooling is not available. Conservatively, no credit is taken for heat transfer to the ground or basement. The surveillances required are outlined in Chapter 16 Subsection 3.7.2.
When rooms are located on the same level and have similar dimensions and internal heat loads, the most unfavorable room is taken to be the representative room for that group of rooms. Table 3H -15 summarizes the representative room temperatures and locations of the room groups.
During the transient event concurrent with LOOP and loss of normal HVAC the heat generated in the rooms is absorbed by the surrounding walls, floor and ceiling. The building concrete acts as a heat sink for passive heat removal. The building is modeled with reinforced concrete steel with a thermal conductivity lower than the design value. The room temperature rises quickly because the heat absorption capacity of air is very low. The heat transfer to the walls floor and ceiling maintain the environmental temperatures below the qualification temperature. DCD Impact DCD Tier 2, Appendix 3H.3.2 will be revised as noted in the attached markup in revision
5.
DCD Tier 2, Table 3H-12 will be revised as noted in the attached markup in revision 5. DCD Tier 2, Tables 3H-14 and 3H-15 will be added to appendix 3H in revision 5. DCD Tier 2, Figure 3H -2 will be added to appendix 3H in revision 5. 
GEH Response
The CRHA air temperature rise requirement is based on the EPRI Utilities Requirements Document (URD) Volume 3, Chapter 9, Section 8.2. The URD does not specify a temperature drop limit.
(A) There is not a CRHA temperature drop limit. However analysis will be provided in the DCD Tier 2, Appendix 3H to show the temperature drop in the CRHA during wintertime conditions. (B) There is not an identified requirement for a temperature drop limit. An ITAAC is not necessary to ensure that the CRHA temperature drop during wintertime conditions is within acceptable limits because there are no set regulatory limits. However, a conservative analysis for CRHA temperature drop during wintertime conditions will be added to the DCD Tier 2, Appendix 3H per RAI 3.11-18 (contained within this letter). The temperatures presented in the analysis are acceptable for habitability and equipment qualification.
DCD Impact
No DCD changes will be made in response to this RAI.
MFN 08-397 4Wi"RB arrangement drawing (Figures 1.2-1 to 1.2-9 ). 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDrITONS
3H.3.2 Accident Conditions
Thermodynamic conditions for safety-rehited equipment in the containment vessel, Ceal ad are ted inTables3H-8 through 3H-10 for accident conditions. Act acident prie fo th" evawl d heat lo n aHeat loads for the evaluated nost accident periods are specified in Table3H-12. In general, the most severe environmental conditions result from a postulated reactor coolant line break inside the containment, lj-f coolant-accident (LOCAI (bounding case) plus Station D.a*ou-(SB .. )loss of offSite oower JLOOPY see Chapter 6 for detailed information. However, accident condifio were also considered for ruptures occurring in the steam turnnel and breaks in the RWWSDC System outside the containment, high energy line break CHELB, plus l e Chapter 6 for detailed information. TabteTables 3H-6 and. 3H-7 list tvcmal ......... the evalu.ted radiation environmental .Ttr2iiearnmlification conditions ins the RB and the CR. AIeseitance Criteila
Environmental Qualification Maximum Temperatwres -The maximum teneratmrm limit for which the safety-related equmipent is qualified is not exceeded, The maximum temperature limit ks specified in Tables 3H-9 and IH-10,
Control Room Habitability Area Temperature -The maximum bulk temperature meets the acceotance criteria stated in Susection 9.41.
Anah* Assumptions
The analysis event asumptions are summarized below. Initial conditions and ampfiom can be foand in Table 314 -14. Heat load wued in the analyis are found in Table 3H -12.
0 The event presented is the most limiting between LOCA or HELB with each concurrent with LOOP. * Normal heating-ventilatiOn and air conMitionng, (HVAQ heating and/or cooling is lost for the first 72 hours of the ac6c•nt -After 72 hours the safety-related equipment heat loads are no longer accounted for because the safety-related eqMuipent needed to maintain safe shutdown no longer requires power to perform their safety-related functions Normal HVAC mitigates the safety-related eqfiOment heat loads when power is available-* During the first 2 hours of the event the nonsafety-related heat loads in the RB and in the CB out6ide of the CRHA nowered by the nonsafety-related batteries are considered in the * Safety-related heat loads are considered throughout the duration of the event when. power * The CRHA calculation only comiders safety-related heat load, Nonafety-related ewaipment deenriziz if active cooling i4 not available. * Room to room interactiom are considere in all calculatio•. & Outside air intake from the EFU is comsimd for the CRHA calculation during maximlm antd minimum tenmeafre cotflitions-* No edO is taken for heat transfer to the ground.
As shomn in Table3H-15, the environmental cualification temperturs for safety-related euaioment is not exceeded during the limiting event based on the presented eailed thermohydraulic analyses tewformed with CONTAIN 2.0. When rooms are located on the same level andi have simlar dimenmio and internal heat loads, the most unfavorable room is taken to be the rwrewntative room for that group of rooms. Solar beat loads were aplied to rooms located above tade., Table 3H as a hea sink for nassive heat removal The room temnerature rse ,uicklv because j:e hew absorpion cavaicit of air is very low. Tle heat transfer to the walls floor and ceingi maintain the environmental temperatures below the qualification tenermr.
Ewing wintertime conditions the RB and CB are isolated and equipment room cool down is insiggificaitn The me for, the CRHA Post 72 hours preented in Table 3H -15 which accounts for heat loads from people and minimal fighting only. demonstrateS that tk Cool down for the RB and C are inconseuential The inetion of ambient air at wintertime conditions when afetyeheat load are not oreet •rovide a faster cool down rate than th other rooms hLcated in the RB and CB. For the winter conditions the 00/ exwedance minimum dry bulb ambient outside air tem=eure (40C°1F) was considered. For the summer conditions the 0MA exceedwe c2 ident maximum dry butb and wet bulb ambient outside air temieratur R47.2!C (117TF) DBt and 26.71C (*0]F) WBt] was conmdere& The daily temnemat-ue range applied was A I SLC (2-r]F)+ T7e temperature in the CRHA remains below the temperature rise acceptance criteria outlined in Subsection 9A4. 1. The W% exceedance coincident maximum temv eature case is oresented in Fiure 3H-2 Cases were considered to ensure that the 0% exceedance maximum outside air temerr was bounding and 100% relative humxity with additional moisture created by CRHA occupantS (latent load) would not lead to a 72 hour CRHA sir tem rature higher than the Me/ exceedance, coincident maximum temperature case., and ensure the heat absorbed by the, CR structureS would not be adversely impacted by the condensation created The ess of tis analysis show that higgr humidity ratios, and subsequently hige specitf en-thalpy, do not affect the maximum temeaure reached with little condensation occurring on the wals of t1e control room. Thew concrete heat sink vrovidhs enough tiermal masýs to kee the CRHA within limits during the limiting event by absorgbn heat loads or hewing ambient air, driag summer or winte"conditions
Water Quality
Reactor water design quality characteristics during normal operation are: Table 3H -12 identifies the potential loation for safety-related equipment assumed for each room or set of rooms and the evaluated heat load capacity. This table also contains the evaluated heat load for nmosafety-related rooms, becaue nonisafety-related equipment is conservatively assured to continue to be powered by nonsafety-related batteries during the first 2 hours ofl & 
3R-25
